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NOTES
THE GRAND JURY-ITS INVESTIGATORY POWERS
AND LIMITATIONS
The grand jury system has been described "as being at the
cross roads";' it will either advance as a strong and invigorated
instrument of law enforcement or it will decline in value and use
culminating in eventual demise. Many contend that two historical
functions which the grand jury has served--guarding the people
from oppression by the Crown and bringing accusations against
law violators-are either outmoded or can be performed more com-
petently by use of the information.2 Yet it is generally agreed that
1. Konowitz, The Grand Jury as an Investigating Body of Public Offi-
cials, 10 St. John's L. Rev. 219, 233 (1936).
2. The argument being that the grand jury is merely an unnecessary,
untrained, time-consuming body which acts as a rubber stamp for the district
attorney. See, e.g., Kains, The Grand Jury, 1 Can. L. Rev. 225 (1902);
Miller, Informations or Indictntents in Felony Cases, 8 Minn. L. Rev. 379(1924); Thompson, Shall the Grad Jury in Ordinary Criminal Cases be
Dispensed with in. Minnesota?, 6 Minn. L. Rev. 615 (1922). For a practical
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a grand jury system has utility in uncovering widespread criminal
operations and in serving as a check on the misconduct of public
officials. 3 Although the grand jury has been a part of the criminal
law for many centuries, its procedures and power are nowhere
clearly defined owing to its origin in the common law,4 a develop-
ment influenced by non-legal factors,,' and lack of statutory clarifica-
tion., Modern criminality with its foothold in governmental
processes and its interstate web of operations utilizing the latest
technological advances presents a square challenge to the adequacy
of these powers to make the grand jury an effective investigatory
body able to withstand the growing competition of other fact-finding
agencies.
7
PERMISSIVE SCOPE OF INQUIRY
The grand jury by statute8 or the common law" has the power
and duty to inquire into all offenses within its jurisdiction. Although
statutes in some states specifically permit the grand jury to investi-
comparison between the use of the information and the grand jury indict-
ment, see Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 Ore. L. Rev. 101,
217, 295 (1931). It is claimed that because of changed political conditions
the grand jury is no longer necessary to protect the public from possible
oppression by the government. See Scragg, The Grand Jury, 2 Temp. L. Q.
317, 318 (1928). These arguments are given added weight by the fact that
England, the cradle of the grand jury, has, in effect, abolished it. See
Trumpler, Decadence of the Grand Jury System in England, 23 The Panel 7
(Jan. 1945).
3. See Report on Prosecution of the National Commission for Law
Observance and Enforcement 37 (1931) ; Willoughby, Principles of Judicial
Administration 193-194 (1929).
4. The origin and early history of the grand jury has been the sub-
ject of considerable disagreement; however, it is clear that by the time of
"le graunde inquest" in approximately 1368, there had been evolved in large
measure the grand jury of today. For good discussions of the history of the
grand jury see Edwards, The Grand Jury 1-44 (1906) ; Morse, supra note
2, at 102-118. The civil law had no provisions for a grand jury. See Fitts v.
Superior Ct., 6 Cal. 2d 230, 240, 57 P. 2d 510, 515 (1936).
5. See United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765, 767 (W.D.N.C. 1883)
(local customs and usages) ; see Note, 39 Calif. L. Rev. 573 (1951).
6. See It re Texas Co., 27 F. Supp. 847, 850-851 (E.D. Ill. 1939) ; see
Nahum and Schatz, The Grand Jury in Connecticut, 5 Conn. B. J. 111, 113-
114 (1931).
7. Other agencies which are capable of undertaking investigations are
legislative committees, special administrative agencies and commissions, the
courts, the governor, the press, the police, magistrates, private organizations,
and individuals. For comment on the efficacy of investigations by these media
as opposed to grand jury investigations see Dession and Cohen, The In-
quisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 Yale L. I. 687 (1932) ; Konowitz,
supra note 1 at 233-235; notes 139-143 infra, and text thereto.
S. See, e.g., N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 252. "The grand jury shall
inquire into all public offenses committed or triable in the county ..
Minn. Stat. § 628.02 (1949).
9. See 1 Housel & Walser, Defending and Prosecuting Federal Crimi-
nal Cases 278-279 (2d ed. 1946).
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gate civil matters'0 or to perform useful civic functions,"' it is
generally held that investigations must be limited'12 to inquiries into
criminal conditions.13 This limitation, of course, prevents probings
into private domestic and financial affairs of individuals merely for
the sake of curiosity.' 4 Since a strict adherence to the general rule
would effectively block investigations into the misconduct of public
officials, statutes frequently provide that a grand jury shall inquire
"into the willful and corrupt misconduct in office of all public
officers in the county."'.5 But if willful and corrupt practices of
public officials are statutory crimes, as in many states, the express
statutory grant of such inquisitorial authority is superfluous.' 6 In view
of the doctrine of separation of powers, however, courts have ex-
pressed concern over the propriety of grand jury investigations of
the legislative and executive branches of government. The general
10. E.g., Minn. Stat. § 628.61 (1949).: "The grand jury shall inquire:
(1) into the condition of every person imprisoned on a criminal charge
triable in the county, and not indicted; (2) into the condition and manage-
ment of the public prisons in the county. . . ." See McLarty v. Fulton
County, 52 Ga. App. 445, 183 S. E. 646 (1936) (statute permits inspection
of books of county officials).
11. See, e.g., Haney v. Board of Comm'rs, 91 Ga. 770, 18 S. E. 28
(1893) (statute not applicable to any county until local grand jury ap-
proves) ; Cahen v. Jarrett, 42 Md. 571 (1875) (recommends liquor licenses) ;
Grand Jury Report, 23 Pa. Dist. 411 (1914) (pass on location and con-
struction of highway). In a few states the grand jury is empowered to act
in a special proceeding, neither criminal or civil, to present accusations lead-
ing to removal from public office. See 22 Okla. Stat. Ann. §§ 1181 et seq.
(1937) ; State v. Scarth, 151 Okla. 178, 3 P. 2d 446 (1931); Cummings,
Georgia Grand Juries Check on Public Officials and Funds, 11 The Panel 1
(Jan.-Feb. 1933).
12. There is a presumption that the grand jury is investigating per-
missive subject matter. People v. Sheridan, 349 Ill. 202, 181 N. E. 617
(1932). Challenges to grand jury investigations usually arise in its follow-
ing procedural situations: a suit by a taxpayer to enjoin the investigation;
an appeal from a contempt citation or from a conviction for perjury before
the grand jury; an action seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the court
from instructing the grand jury; a petition to prohibit enforcement of a
court order to obey a subpoena, or an attack by an interested party on an
indictment or presentment.
13. E.g., Pankey v. People, 2 Ill. 79 (1833); Ex parte Jennings, 91
Tex. Crim. 612, 240 S. W. 942 (1922) ; see Alt v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. 337,
339, 203 S. W. 53, 54 (1918). But cf. State v. Ingels, 4 Wash. 2d 676, 104 P.
2d 944, cert. denied, 311 U. S. 708 (1940). Common law prohibited an in-
vestigation of an offense barred by the statute of limitations, see People v.
Beatty, 14 Cal. 567, 571 (1860) ; see Edwards, The Grand Jury 103, but the
more recent cases make no such requirement on ground that the investigation
may lead to discovery of crimes which may be prosecuted. People v. Curtis,
36 Cal. App. 2d 306, 98 P. 2d 228 (2d Dist. 1939) ; State v. Kasherman, 177
Minn. 200, 224 N. W. 838, cert. denied, 280 U. S. 602 (1929) (alternative
holding); see 35 Minn. L. Rev. 667 (1951).
14. See People v. Conzo, 301 Ill. App. 524, 528-529, 23 N. E. 2d 210,
213 (1st Dist. 1939) ; Ex parte Gould, 60 Tex. Crim. 442, 444, 132 S. W. 364,
365 (1910).
15. Minn. Stat. § 628.61 (1949) ; see N. Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 260.
16. See State v. Reichert, 226 Ind. 358, 361-362, 80 N. E. 2d 289, 290
(1948) ; Konowitz, supra note 1, at 220-221.
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approach seems to be that the judicial branch, as represented by
the grand jury, can not exercise control over the executive or
legislative, but can act as a check on their activitiesY.1 Accordingly,
it has been held that the court could order an investigation of
charges of graft and scandal against a governor and other state
officials., And investigations of individual legislators for criminal
acts pertaining to legislative work are permitted ;19 however, the
legislature as an entity can not commit a crime and is thus out-of-
bounds as an area of inquiry.20 While such a distinction is sound
in theory, its application becomes difficult when the investigation
concerns a large group of legislators or the members of a particular
legislative committee.
Since the jurisdiction of the grand jury is only co-extensive
with the jurisdiction of the court to which it is appendant, 21 in-
vestigations are generally limited, in absence of statute, to matters
in the county in which the grand jury is assembled ;22 and violations
of state and federal law are proper subjects of inquiry only for
state and federal grand juries respectively.2 3 An important issue
has arisen regarding whether a grand jury may investigate acts
or crimes occurring outside of the county in which it is impaneled
in seeking to determine whether a crime was committed in the
county. If the grand jury's investigation is a good faith effort to
unearth local crimes, the better view would allow such an investiga-
tion together with the sanctions of contempt and perjury necessary
to make it effective.2 4 But if the grand jury investigates acts outside
the county merely to obtain an indictment for perjury committed
17. See Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation, 332 Pa. 289, 295-
296, 2 A. 2d 783, 787 (1938). But cf. Appeal of Hartranft, 85 Pa. St. 433
(1877).
18. Ibid.
19. Samish v. Superior Ct., 28 Cal. App. 2d 685, 83 P. 2d 305 (3d Dist.
1938) ; see Moore v. Delaney, 180 Misc. 844, 847, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 95, 98
(Sup. Ct. 1943).
20. Ibid.
21. United States v. Hill, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,364, 317 (C.C.D. Va.
1809) ; see Nahun and Schatz, supra note 6, at 122.
22. E.g., State v. Mitchell, 202 N. C. 439, 163 S. E. 581 (1932). Often
this limitation is statutory. E.g., Minn. Stat. § 628.02 (1949). Of course thejurisdiction of a federal grand jury is limited by federal districts and not
counties.
23. See Clairborne v. United States, 77 F. 2d 682, 690 (8th Cir. 1935).
It should also be noted that State law under the doctrine of Erie v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U. S. 68 (1938), does not control the powers and functions of
federal grand juries, United States v. Warren, 26 F. Supp. 333 (E.D. N.Y.
1939), but state law exerts some influence. See United States v. Kilpatrick,
16 Fed. 765, 767 (W.D. N.C. 1883).
24. See United States v. Girgenti, 197 F. 2d 218, 219 (3d Cir. 1952);
Samish v. Superior Ct, 28 Cal. App. 2d 685, 688, 83 P. 2d 305, 306 (3d Dist.
1938) ; People v. Conzo, 301 Ill. App. 524, 529, 23 N. E. 2d 210, 213 (1st
Dist. 1939).
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before the grand jury, the indictment will not be upheld.25 Bearing
in mind that large scale criminal organizations and conspiracies are
likely to commit acts in one county or state which would give rise to
crimes in another,," this distinction is sound for a grand jury should
not be precluded from investigations having legitimate objectives.
However, an inquiry made with knowledge that the crime under
investigation was committed outside the jurisdiction and hence not
subject to a presentment or indictment would be a waste of the
grand jury's time and an unproductive expense for the taxpayer 27-
factors outweighing the possible awakening of community ire at
disgraceful public conditions which even a bad faith investigation
of non-local matters would precipitate.
INQUISITORIAL POWERS AND LIMITATIONS
Since this Note is concerned with the grand jury as an effective
investigatory body, the powers under discussion will be those en-
abling the grand jury to make an adequate inquiry into irregular
conditions in the community. These inquisitorial powers, called the
grand jury's most important,2 are best described by an examination
of the different phases of a grand jury investigation."8 While this
examination will disclose legal confinements on the grand jury's
power, practical limitations are also present. Despite the attempt
to recruit intelligent and skillful grand jurors by choosing them
in a selective manner,3 0 investigating experience and know-how,
so important in the often complicated investigations of today, is
unavoidably lacking.31 The grand jury is also limited in the time
and money available for investigations.3 2 In order to somewhat
offset these deficiencies some states have provided for special grand
juries which may be merely an additional grand jury available
25. Bennett v. District Ct., 81 Okla. Crim. 351, 162 P. 2d 561 (1945)
(alternative holding).
26. See United States v. Girgenti, 197 F. 2d 218, 219 (3d Cir. 1952);
see King, The Control of Organized Crime in America, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 52
(1951).
27. See Bennett v. District Ct, 81 Okla. Crim. 351, 377, 162 P. 2d 561,
572 (1945).
28. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 284 (E.D. Pa.
1933).
29. For general discussions of grand jury inquisitorial powers see
Notes, 120 A. L. R. 437 (1939), 106 A. L. R. 1383 (1937), 22 A. L. R. 1356
(1923) ; 21 Minn. L. Rev. 605 (1937). For more specific treatment of federal
grand jury powers see United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283 (N.D. Cal.
1952) ; Notes, 39 Calif. L. Rev. 573 (1951), 4 Stan. L. Rev. 68 (1951).
30. See Morse, .supra note 2, at 226-238.
31. See Konowitz, supra note 1, at 230-231.
32. See Dession and Cohen, supra note 7, at 696-698; Kidd, Why Grand
Jury's Power Is a Menace to Organized Crime, 12 The Panel 32, 34 (Sept.-
Oct. 1934).
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during the term of court, 33 an extraordinary grand jury convened
only on special occasions,3 4 a so-called "auditing" grand jury de-
voted exclusively to investigatory work, 5 or the "one-man grand
jury" which in effect is a judge or magistrate with inquisitorial
powers.38 It is not within the scope of this Note to discuss in detail
the differences in inquisitorial power of each of these special types
of grand juries.
Initiating An Investigation
Generally the grand jury is called into session by the court
to which it is appendant 37 for the term of the court.38 A grand jury
investigation may be commenced in four ways: by a charge to the
grand jury from the court or from the district attorney, by suit
of a private individual, or by the grand jury on its own motion.
While the first two methods are generally permissible,39 the
33. See Chamberlin, Special Grand Juries in Illinois, 22 J. Crim. L. &
Criminalogy, 165 (1931). There is authority that at common law the court
had the inherent right to summon a special grand jury when justice demanded.
See People v. Blumenfeld, 330 II1. 474, 478, 161 N. E. 857, 858 (1928).
However, the right to summon a special grand jury is usually provided by
statute. E.g., Minn. Stat §§ 484.08, 484.30 (1949) ; see People v. Grizzel, 382
Ill. 11, 22, 46, N. E. 2d 78, 82 (1943).
34. See People v. McNulty, 279 N. Y. 563, 18 N. E. 2d 854 (1939) ; see
In re Petition for Special Grand Jury, 50 F. 2d 973, 974 (M.D. Pa. 1931).
35. See Chamberlain, Auditing Grand Jury System, 12 The Panel 6
(Jan.-Feb. 1934) ; Daru, Broadening the Scope of the Grand Jury, 12 The
Panel 12 (Jan.-Feb. 1934); Scott, An Auditing Grand Jury Is Suggested,
9 The Panel 32 (May-June 1931).
36. For discussion of the problems concerning one-man grand juries
see Winters, The Michigan, One-Man Grand Jury, 28 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 137
(1945); Gallagher, The One-Man Jury-A Reply, 29 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 20
(1945) ; Note, 9 Detroit L. Rev. 127 (1948). If the one-man grand jury is not
authorized in the jurisdiction, the judge has no authority to become a court of
inquiry complete with inquisitorial power. Ketcham v. Commonwealth, 204
Ky. 168, 263 S. W. 725 (1924).
37. Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(a); Minn. Stat. § 628.42 (1949). It has been
held that a grand jury can not return a valid indictment after reassembling on
its own motion subsequent to being discharged by the court, Hicks v. State,
97 Fla. 199, 120 So. 330 (1929), or after the district attorney has ordered the
grand jury to reassemble without court order. People v. Radewitz, 199 Misc.
1058, 103 N. Y. S. 2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1951). However, Oklahoma by con-
stitutional provision allows a requisite group of petitioning citizens to force
the court to summon the grand jury. See Willoughby, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 194.
38. E.g., Minn. Stat § 628.58 (1949); see State v. Lewis & Clark
County, 124 Mont. 282, 291, 220 P. 2d 1052, 1056 (1950) (common law).
But see Fed, R. Crim. P. 6(g). Frequently a grand jury is permitted to con-
tinue in session after the term of court to complete unfinished business.
Comnpare Shenker v. Harr, 332 Pa. 382, 2 A. 2d 298 (1938) (continued investi-
gation proper), with Commonwealth v. Wilson, 134 Pa. Super 222, 4 A. 2d 324
(1939) (consideration of new indictments improper).
39. At least one state, Pennsylvania, allows an investigation to be
commenced only on charge from the court See notes 49-51 infra, and text
thereto. Some jurisdictions require a preliminary hearing for the defendant
before the district attorney may charge the grand jury. See Willoughby, op.
cit. supra note 3, at 178.
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judicial authority differs considerably concerning the latter two.
It is urged by some courts that a citizen has a duty to his community
to expose a crime within his knowledge and thus should have a
right to lodge complaints with the grand jury for purposes of
initiating an inquiry ;1o whereas, the courts limiting such action 41
reason that individual informers are moved more by personal
enmity than a quest for justice.4 2 Even though these arguments have
some validity, the more basic consideration involved is whether a
private individual should be allowed to present any grievance
directly to the grand jury even though it be foolhardy and thus a
waste of time, or whether he should be compelled to present his
complaints either to the district attorney for evaluation and subse-
quent action if advisable or to the local magistrate for a compara-
tively limited investigation of the claim. 43 If the latter view were
adopted, a corrupt or irresponsible district attorney or magistrate
would doubtless present some obstacle to the airing of unsavory
conditions in the community.44 On the other hand, the grand jury
could investigate such conditions without the aid of a district at-
torney and the possible use of the grand jury as a political weapon
coupled with the inefficient procedure attendant on permitting indi-
viduals to initiate investigations overbalances this objection.
Although the common law is not clear regarding the power of
the grand jury to start a general investigation on its own motion,4 .
the majority view today in the state courts sanctions an investiga-
tion to be initiated in this manner merely on the suspicion that a
crime was committed without any particular crime or suspect in
mind.46 This position has also been adopted by the federal courts
40. See, e.g., King v. Second Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 234 Ala. 106, 108,
173 So. 498, 499 (1937) ; In re Lester, 77 Ga. 143, 148 (1886). The early
English criminal system sanctioned private prosecutors. See Hale v. Henkel,
201 U. S. 43, 59 (1906).
41. E.g., People v. Parker, 374 Ill. 524, 30 N. E. 2d 11 (1940), cert.
denied, 313 U. S. 560 (1941) ; see United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765, 769
(W.D. N.C. 1883).
42. See Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,255, at 994 (C.C.D.
Cal. 1872) ; Note, 17 N. C. L. Rev. 43, 46 (1938).
43. For a discussion of the inquisitorial powers of a magistrate see
note 140 infra, and text thereto.
44. See Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86, 40 A. 2d 319 (1944), where an
individual was allowed to place a complaint before the grand jury after
the district attorney and magistrate refused to act.
45. See, e.g., O'Regan v. Schermerhorn, 25 N. J. Misc. 1, 23, 50 A. 2d
10, 22 (Sup. Ct. 1946), 31 Minn. L. Rev. 500 (1947) ; see Konowitz, supra
note 1, at 221.
46. E.g., Blaney v. State, 74 Md. 153, 21 Atl. 547 (1891) ; Stanley v.
State, 171 Tenn. 406, 104 S. W. 2d 819 (1937) ; see Samish v. Superior Ct., 28
Cal. App. 2d 685, 688, 83 P. 2d 305, 306 (3d Dist. 1938). However, because
of ignorance of their full rights, the grand jurors often fail to exercise this
power fully if at all. See Tuttle, Grand Atries by Exercising Their Initiative
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after some vacillation.4 7 There is, however, some indication in a
fairly recent federal case that a grand jury may not take the next
step of conducting an investigation of anticipated offenses. 4 Such
investigations would undoubtedly prevent the commission of crime in
some instances but this would be far outweighed by the dangers to
privacy and public confidence in the grand jury inherent in specu-
lative probing and the time and effort wasted in futile inquiries.
Directly opposing the majority position, Pennsylvania has estab-
lished that any investigation except as provided by special statute,
must be preceded by a charge from the court.49 In addition, a
charge may be given only if certain rigid requirements and condi-
tions are satisfied50 including (a) trustworthy information warrant-
ing an inquiry, (b) based on at least one known offense, (c) not
aimed at individuals but at widespread criminal conditions (d)
which the ordinary processes of law are not adequate to reach."
An intermediate view which has been advanced permits the grand
jury to instigate an investigation on its own motion only where
a crime of a specific character has been committed by a particular
person whose identity may at the time be unknown.5 2
Can Put Fear into Criminals, 11 The Panel 13 (Mar.-April 1933). The
process of initiating an investigation upon suspicion should be distinguished
from returning an indictment upon rumor which is generally not permitted.
See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 65 (1906).
47. The rule was established in Hale v. Henkel, supra note 46, and has
since been followed in such cases as, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 251
U. S. 407 (1920) ; United States v. Phila. & R. Ry., 225 Fed. 301 (E.D. Pa.
1915) ; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Pa. 1933). The
early view in the federal courts permitted the grand jury to institute all pro-
ceedings on its own motion, see Edwards, The Grand Jury 100, but in the
classic explanation of the powers and duties of the grand jury by Justice
Field in 1872 in a charge to a federal grand jury in California, the jury was
seemingly limited to inquiries placed before it by the court or district attor-
ney and to investigations based on knowledge obtained in the course of
investigation or that coming to the jurors from their own observation or
disclosure of their associates. See Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No.
18,255, at 994 (C.C.D. Cal. 1872). A recent federal case has interpretted the
Field charge to mean that the grand jury could start no independent investi-
gation. See United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 287 n. 1 (N.D. Cal.
1952).
48. See United States v. Johnson, 123 F. 2d 111, 119 (7th Cir. 1941),
rev'd on other grounds, 319 U. S. 503 (1943).
49. See McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 58, 187 AtI. 498, 503 (1936);
Commonwealth v. Hubbs, 137 Pa. Super. 229, 243, 8 A. 2d 611, 617 (1939).
Other states have also taken a restrictive approach. See, e.g., State v. Kemp,
126 Conn. 60, 68, 9 A. 2d 63, 68 (1939).
50. See Philadelphia County Grand Jury, 347 Pa. 316, 32 A. 2d 199
(1943) ; In re Memorial of Officers & Directors of Citizen's Ass'n, 8 Phila.
478 (1870).
51. Commonwealth v. Rhey, 140 Pa. Super. 340, 14 A. 2d 192 (1940);
In re Petition for Grand Jury Investigation, 48 Lack. Jur. 209 (1947).
52. See In re Morse, 42 Misc. 664, 665, 87 N. Y. Supp. 721, 722 (Gen.
Sess. 1904).
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In support of their restrictive position on self-initiated grand
jury investigations, the Pennsylvania courts have argued that in-
vestigations still in the stage of pure speculation are better handled
by police since without the guiding hand of the court, the grand jury
may fan out into unpermissible areas or by unnecessary investiga-
tions incur needless expense, cause inconvenience to the citizens
and shake public confidence in its activities.5 3 Doubtless in many
instances a judge is more skilled in determining the chances of an
investigation being fruitful than a grand jury of laymen, but this is
hardly a reason to prohibit the jury from also commencing its own
inquiries. The judge in deciding whether to initiate a grand jury
investigation must place great reliance on information gathered by
the police and such dependency involves the danger of a corrupt or
criminally involved police force effectively preventing an inquiry by
covering up evidence. 4 Moreover, the one sound reason for con-
tinuing the grand jury is to have available a body of interested and
able citizens who can independently check on the affairs of the com-
munity.5  This objective can be satisfactorily achieved only if the
grand jury is free to investigate matters of its own choosing with
no resemblance to a rubber stamp either for the prosecuting attor-
ney or the court. Often expressed fears of opening the way for wild
and irresponsible grand juries are greatly exaggerated. There are
generally recognized limitations and checks on grand jury power
such as the grand juror's oath,5 6 the power of the court to dismiss a
grand jury at any time without reason," the control of subpoena
53. See McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 62, 187 Atl. 498, 505 (1936).
But see Dauphin County Grand Jury Investigation, 332 Pa. 289, 308, 2 A. 2d
783, 792 (1938) (dissenting opinion).
54. A recent example is the connection between Brooklyn police and
gamblers brought to light in the celebrated grand jury hearings and court
trials involving gambler Harry Gross. See, e.g., N. Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1952,
p. 27, col. 2.
55. See note 3 supra, and text thereto.
56. E.g., Minn. Stat. § 358.07(1) (1949) ; see Edwards, The Grand
Jury 99-100. The court also exercises other controls over the grand jury. See,
e.g., State v. Youngblood, 225 Ind. 129, 144, 73 N. E. 2d 174, 180 (1947)
(court may investigate grand jury irregularities).
57. See, e.g., In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 107 F. Supp.
628, 629 (D.D.C. 1952) ; United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 292
(N.D. Cal. 1952). Butt see Baker v. State, 183 Ind. 1, 5, 108 N. E. 7, 9 (1915)
(power to dismiss should be exercised only in proper cases). But a grand jury
can not discharge itself. See State v. Burney, 229 Mo. App. 759, 768, 84 S. N1.
2d 659, 664 (1935). But if it were argued that just cause should be prere-
quisite to dismissal, a difficult problem of who could effectively object to an
arbitrary dismissal is presented, possibilities being the district attorney, the
grand jurors, or taxpayers. See Note, 4 Stan. L. Rev. 68, 73-74 (1951). It
has been suggested that upon due notice to the court, that the grand jury be
allowed to finish a current examination even if the court disapproves. See
id. at 76, discussing a provision to that effect in a bill introduced by Senator
Nixon in the 82d Congress: S. 2086, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 1951). The bill
subsequently died in the judiciary Committee.
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and contempt process by the court,58 the reluctance of a district at-
torney to assist irresponsible investigations, and the previously
discussed limits on the scope of permissible inquiry.5 9
Powers to Gather Information
In compiling information in a general investigation, the grand
jury may utilize the knowledge of the individual jurors,60 in some
instances visit and survey places connected with a particular in-
vestigation, 1 demand production of relevant documents, and most
important, interrogate witnesses. Although the inquisitorial power
to call witnesses during a general investigation is clearly established,
frequent problems arise concerning who may be called and what
questions may be propounded. In some instances individuals volun-
tarily appear before the grand jury to give information relative to
the current investigation. The courts often have erroneously failed
to distinguish this practice from the previously discussed situation
of private persons initiating an inquiry. 2 There is need in the latter
situation for an intervening agent such as the district attorney to
prevent interruption of current investigations and wasting of the
grand jury's time on unfounded accusations by screening out legiti-
mate complaints and personally presenting them to the jury at the
most advantageous time. But once an inquiry is commenced there is
little interference caused by volunteers for they may be inter-
rogated by the grand jury foreman and allowed to give testimony
only if it is relevant to the current investigation. Since the relevant
information may contain accusations against particular individuals,
the argument that volunteers should be prohibited because they are
primarily motivated my personal enmity is also applicable.63 It has
been suggested that a distinction be made which sanctions the ap-
58. See United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 293 (N.D. Cal.
1952) ; see Edwards, The Grand Jury 104.
59. See notes 8-27 supra, and text thereto.
60. State v. Richard, 50 La. Ann. 210, 23 So. 331 (1898); Common-
wealth v. Hayden. 163 Mass. 453, 40 N. E. 846 (1895) ; c.f. note 47 supra.
And see United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 300-301 (1952) : "It might
be necessary for a single grand juror to seek information in a night club, a
bar or a house of ill fame. His movements are not subject to question. If they
were, effectiveness might be lost." A juror wishing to present evidence before
the grand jury must conform to its procedure. Clinton v. Superior Ct., 23
Cal. App. 2d 342, 73 P. 2d 252 (2d Dist. 1937).
61. State v. Johnson, 116 La. 855, 41 So. 117 (1906) ; see United States
v. Smyth, supra note 60, at 300-301. Contra: People v. Pisante, 179 Misc.
308, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 850 (County Ct. 1943). Statutes frequently permit the
grand jury to visit public institutions for investigative purposes. E.g., Minn.
Stat. § 628.62 (1949) (prisons).
62. See notes 40-43 supra, and text thereto; Charge to Grand Jury, 30
Fed. Cas. No. 18,255, at 994 (C.C.D. Cal. 1872) ; see State v. Stewart, 45
La. Ann. 1164,1167, 14 So. 143, 145 (1893).
63. See note 42 smpra, and text thereto.
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pearance of the civic-minded informer but prohibits those who seek
to press charges against individuals in the role of a private prosecu-
tor.64 However, practical application of such a line of differentiation
is impossible because of the necessity of determining the intent of
each volunteer. Further, the distinction is unsound for all relevant
evidence should be available to the grand jury even though dis-
closed for purposes of revenge.
Since investigations can not depend only upon volunteers, the
grand jury has the power to subpoena witnesses."' The federal
courts take the position that a witness has no concern with the com-
petency or relevancy of his testimony and thus need not be told
before testifying the subject matter or names of persons under
investigation."0 A doctrine flourishes in some state" courts, how-
ever, that a witness must be given information regarding the in-
quiry in order to inform him of the relevancy of his testimony. T A
witness once under examination can avail himself of the common
evidentiary privileges, 8 the most important being that against self-
incrimination."9 Since this privilege often prevents or disrupts a
whole inquiry, some statutes have in effect waived the privilege by
providing immunity from prosecution for the witness in regard to
the crimes proscribed.7 0 One proposed solution, which merits an
64. See Note, 17 N. C. L. Rev. 43, 45-46 (1938).
65. The subpoena process is the court's and not the grand jury's or
district attorney's, see It re National Window Glass Workers, 287 Fed. 219,
225 (N.D. Ohio 1922), but statutes in many jurisdictions give the grandjury the power to issue subpoenas. See Dession and Cohen, supra note 7,
at 697 n. 33. But see Edwards. The Grand Jury 104. Frequently for con-
venience the district attorney is given the power to issue subpoenas and in event
of his refusal to obey the grand jury's wishes he may be commanded by
court order or replaced by a special district attorney. See Dession and Cohen,
mcpra note 7, at 697-698.
66. E.g., Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273 (1919) ; United States
v. McGovern, 60 F. 2d 880 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U. S. 650 (1932) ;
In re Black, 47 F. 2d 542 (2d Cir. 1931). Contra: In re Shaw, 172 Fed. 520
(C.C. S.D. N.Y. 1909).
67. Ex parte Jennings, 91 Tex. Crim. 612, 240 S. W. 942 (1910);
People v. Doe (Byk), 247 App. Div. 324, 286 N. Y. Supp. 343 (2d Dep't),
aff'd per curium, 272 N. Y. 473, 3 N. E. 2d 875 (1936) ; see McCarthy v.
Clancy, 110 Conn. 482, 502, 148 Atl. 551, 559-560 (1930).
68. See, e.g., People v. Warden of County Jail, 150 Misc. 714, 720, 270
N. Y. Supp. 362, 365 (Sup. Ct.), affd per curium, 271 N. Y. Supp. 1059 (App.
Div. 1st Dep't 1934) (attorney-client privilege).
69. See Note, 39 Calif. L. Rev. 573, 575 (1951).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Weinberg, 65 F. 2d 394 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 290 U. S. 675 (1933) (immunity granted by National Prohibition
Act) ; accord, State v. Rodrigues, 219 La. 217, 52 So. 2d 756 (1951) (state
constitution grants immunity for testimony in bribery prosecution) ; Common-
wealth v. Haines, 171 Pa. Super. 362, 90 A. 2d 842 (1952) (same). A promise
of immunity by the district attorney is not sufficient to compel the witness to
answer, but such a promise would prohibit punishment for the crimes dis-
closed. See People v. Conzo, 310 Ill. App. 524, 530, 23 N. E. 2d 210, 213
(1st Dist. 1939).
Vol. 37:586
NOTES
opportunity to be evaluated in actual practice, would automatically
waive the privilege when public officials are witnesses.7 ' While it
appears clear that one can not refuse to testify, except as to privi-
leged matter, merely because he may be a defendant sometime in the
future,7 2 courts are not in agreement whether the quarry of a cur-
rent investigation can be called as a witness to obtain information
necessary to return an indictment. Some authorities condemn all
interrogation in this situation ;73 others treat the suspect no differ-
ently than other witnesses. 74 However, an intermediate approach
allowing the grand jury to interrogate a suspect only if he affirma-
tively consents to testify after being informed of his constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination would seem to more closely
reconcile the investigative values to be gained from such information
with the rights of the individuals.7 1
In order to compel the production of documents the subpoena
duces tecum is available to the grand jury, its widest use being in
the uncovering of corporate papers and records.76 Besides the re-
quirement that such documents be relevant and material to the
inquiry in question,7 7 the chief limitation is furnished by the con-
stitutional restraint against unreasonable searches and seizures.78
71. See Model Code of Evidence, Rule 207 (1942) ; Nahum and Schatz,
supra note 6, at 137.
72. E.g., Commonwealth v. Butler, 171 Pa. Super. 350, 90 A. 2d 838
(1952).
73. E.g., United States v. Edgerton, 80 Fed. 374 (D. Mont. 1897);
State v. Corteau, 198 Minn. 433, 270 N. W. 144 (1936) ; People v. Bermel, 71
Misc. 356, 128 N. Y. Supp. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
74. E.g., O'Connell v. United States, 40 F. 2d 201 (2d Cir), cert. granvted,
281 U. S. 716, appeal dismissed per slip., 296 U. S. 667 (1930) ; see State v.
Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 72, 9 A. 2d 63, 69 (1939).
75. It is not settled whether a witness may be asked if he knows of
any crime committed in the community and if so to divulge it. Compare EX
parte Gould, 60 Tex. Crim. 442, 449, 132 S. W. 364, 367 (1910) (permissible),
with United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765, 769 (W.D. N.C. 1883) (im-
proper), and In re Lester, 77 Ga. 143, 147 (1886) (same).
76. In order for a federal grand jury to subpoena records of an out-of-
state corporation, the corporation must be doing business in the federaljudicial district in which the grand jury is sitting. In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, Duces Tecum, 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D. N.Y. 1947). Documents
produced by subpoena duces tecum remain the exclusive property of the
producer and can be repossessed at the close of each grand jury session. In re
Bendix Aviation Corp., 58 F. Supp. 953, 954 (S.D. N. Y. 1945).
77. Although it is generally agreed that the subpoena can only be as
broad as the purpose of the investigation, different views are held regarding
the extent of disclosure necessary to show relevancy or materiality. Compare
People v. Allen, 410 Ill. 508, 103 N. E. 2d 92 (1951), cert. denied, 344 U. S.
815 (1952) (as precise a statement of subject under investigation as cir-
cumstances permit), with Manning v. Valente, 272 App. Div. 358, 72 N. Y. S.
2d 88 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 297 N. Y. 681, 77 N. E. 2d 3 (1947) (no need for
public disclosure of purpose of inquiry).
78. In contrast to the protection afforded by the privilege against un-
reasonable search and seizure, corporate and union documents are not pro-
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Reasonableness is crucial in determining whether a call for docu-
ments is a violation of this privilege.7 9 And although the considera-
tions involved in this general test are as varied as the individual fact
situations, stress is often laid on the following factors: (1) the
nature, purpose, and scope of inquiry,80 (2) the detail used in
specifying the wanted documents,81 (3) the scope of the requested
production in terms of the number of documents sought,82 (4) the
period of time covered by hte requested documents,83 and (5) the
effect on the person or business being deprived of important records
for a length of time. 4 The threat of a contempt of court citation
backs up the grand jury in the search for information from reluctant
witnesses or document holders, the power being wielded by the
court to which it is appendant.85 Since the testimony is under oath,
perjury sanctions are also available to encourage truthful testimony.
The general rule, by common law86 or statute, 7 limits the grand
jury to a consideration of that evidence which would be admissible
at trial, the reasoning being either that other evidence is inherently
untrustworthy or that it would be both unfair to the defendant and
inefficient as a practical matter to indict on evidence which cannot
tected from disclosure by the privilege against self-incrimination. United
States v. White, 322 U. S. 694 (1944) (union documents) ; Wilson v. United
States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911) (corporate documents). Apart from the limita-
tions imposed by privileges, the court may prevent an abusive use of the
subpoena process. See In re National Window Glass Workers, 287 Fed. 219,
224, (N.D. Ohio 1922) ; see Note, 39 Calif. L. Rev. 573, 577-579 (1951).
79. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906) ; It re United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 73 F. Supp. 207 (D. Mass. 1947). See also Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(c).
80. See In re Grand Jury Investigations, 33 F. Supp. 367 (M.D. N.C.
1940) ; In re Motions to Quash Subpoenas, 30 F. Supp. 527 (S.D. Cal.
1939) ; People v. Allen, 410 Ill. 508, 103 N. E. 2d 92 (1951), cert. denied,
344 U. S. 815 (1952).
81. See In re Eastman Kodak Co., 7 F. R. D. 760, 765 (W.D. N.Y. 1947);
In re United Shoe Mach. Corp., 73 F. Supp. 207 (D. Mass. 1947) (age and
number of documents affects the detail required) ; Ex parte Gould, 60 Tex.
Crim. 442, 132 S. W. 364 (1910).
82. See In re Alexander, 8 F. R. D. 559 (S.D. N.Y. 1949) ; In re United
Shoe Mach. Corp., .rupra note 81.
83. Compare In re Borden Co., 75 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ill. 1948) (period
of 20 years not unreasonable), with In re United Shoe Mach. Corp., 7 F. R. D.
756 (D. Mass. 1947) (20 years unreasonable-10 years reasonable), and It re
Eastman Kodak Co., 7 F. R. D. 760 (W.D. N.Y. 1947) (10 years reasonable).
84. See In re American Sugar Refining Co., 178 Fed. 109 (C.C. S.D.
N.Y. 1910), appeal disnissed, 223 U. S. 743 (1911); People v. Doe, 72
N. Y. S. 2d 83 (Gen. Sess. 1945).
85. See Commonwealth v. Butler, 171 Pa. Super. 350, 356, 90 A. 2d 838,
841 (1952). A recalcitrant witness may be summarily punished, the contempt
being the "presence of the court," see 36 Minn. L. Rev. 965 (1952), since the
normal procedure is to bring reluctant witnesses before the judge and com-
mand them to answer. See O'Connell v. United States, 40 F. 2d 201 (2d Cir.),
cert. granted, 281 U. S. 716, appeal dismissed per sap., 296 U. S. 667 (1930).
86. E.g., People v. Budzinski, 159 Misc. 566, 289 N. Y. Supp. 656
(County Ct. 1936) ; see 21 Minn. L. Rev. 605, 606 (1937).
87. E.g., Minn. Stat. § 628.59 (1949).
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be used to convict. However, many courts adhering to this general
rule in effect abort it in the case of hearsay by refusing absolutely
to determine if hearsay evidence was considered ss -mainly be-
cause of the rule that grand jury hearings are to remain secret 9- -
or allowing an indictment to stand if it is supported by any evidence
besides the hearsay.", Moreover, there is some authority which
allows the consideration of hearsay evidence without limitation,91 at
least in a general investigation as distinguished from an investigation
of a specific crime.92 The grand jury should be unequivocally allowed
to consider hearsay evidence. In addition to taking account of the
inherent limitations on the grand jurors' intelligently applying ex-
clusionary rules against incompetent evidence93 and the burden
which such a method of challenging indictments places on the
courts, this approach recognizes that grand jury investigations are
promoted by permitting a large area of inquiry.
Aids to Investigation
Although the inquisitorial powers of the grand jury may not be
delegated to another authority,94 the grand jury may nevertheless
utilize the assistance of other persons and agencies in the exercise of
these powers in a general investigation. The common law is clouded
regarding the right of a district attorney to appear before the grand
jury,"5 but the general approach now-defined largely by statute-
accords him that right with the limitation that he not be present
during the deliberations and voting of the grand jury.9 6 Frequently
88. E.g., United States v. Direct Sales Co., 40 F. Supp. 917 (W.D.
S.C. 1941), aff'd, 131 F. 2d 835 (4th Cir. 1942).
89. For a good discussion on secrecy of grand jury hearings see 8
Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2360-2363 (3d ed. 1940).
90. E.g., Stern v. Superior Ct., 78 Cal. App. 2d 9, 177 P. 2d 308 (1st
Dist. 1947) ; accord, State v. Marshall, 140 Minn. 363, 168 N. W. 174 (1918)
(privileged communication) ; see 1 Housel & Walser, op. cit. supra note 9,
at 284.
91. E.g., Maddox v. State, 213 Ind. 537, 12 N. E. 2d 947 (1938).
92. See State v. Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 71, 9 A. 2d 63, 69 (1939).
93. However, the district attorney may generally advise the grandjurors on legal matters including the rules of evidence. Minn. Stat. § 628.63(1949) ; see Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,255, at 996 (C.C.D.
Cal. 1872) ; Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,248, at 980 (C.C.D.
W.Va. 1868). But see United States v. Kilpatrick, 16 Fed. 765, 770 (W.D.
N.C. 1883) (only court should advise on matters of law).
94. See In re Grand Jurors Ass'n, 25 N. Y. S. 154, 155 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
95. See State v. Crowder, 193 N. C. 130, 132, 136 S. E. 337 (1927);
see Edwards, The Grand Jury 127 (no district attorney).
96. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d) ; Edwards, The Grand Jury 127-129;
Note, 4 A. L. R. 2d 392 (1949). But see Nahum and Schatz, supra note 6,
at 142. The presence of an unauthorized person in the grand jury room -will
not necessarily void an indictment. E.g., State v. Canatella, 96 N. H. 202,
72 A. 2d 507 (1950) (police officer present during deliberations) ; State v.
McFeeley, 136 N. J. L. 102, 54 A. 2d 797 (1947) (no prejudice despite pres-
ence of deputy attorney general).
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the district attorney will summon and interrogate witnesses be-
fore the grand jury,97 and, in addition, counsel and advise the
jurors.98 If the district attorney needs help or is unable to par-
ticipate in a particular investigation, assistant or special district
attorneys are authorized parties who may appear and par-
ticipate in the grand jury hearing, 99 but private attorneys are
not. 100 Although the district attorney is the most important source
of aid and guidance to a grand jury conducting a general investi-
gation, 01 he has no legal power to control the actions of the jury
in the sense of dictating indictments or preventing a particular
inquiry. 10 2 Nevertheless, the district attorney does exercise tre-
mendous influence over the handling and course of a general investi-
gation-to such an extent that grand jury docility, apparent in the
case of everyday criminal indictments, may jeopardize the grand
jury's position as an investigatory, body unless jurors begin to
independently assert and use their available inquisitorial powers.
Although the use of a stenographer by the grand jury was un-
known at common law, the majority rule now permits stenographers
in the jury room during testimony,'03 usually on the ground that
keeping a record of events assists the jurors in an investigation
and helps to prevent perjury by witnesses.' 4 Moreover, the courts
have permitted an interpreter to be utilized either on the rationale
that he is a witness'0 5 or on condition that he be sworn to secrecy
and remain in the jury room only when performing his function. 00
97. E.g., Minn. Stat. § 388.05 (1949) ; see Delaware County Grand Jury
Investigation, 30 Del. County 237, 249 (1941).
98. See note 93 supra.
99. State v. Krause, 260 Wis. 313, 50 N. W. 2d 439 (1951) ; see United
States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 306 (N.D. Cal. 1952). Contra: United
States v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 163 Fed. 66 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1908)
(special district attorney). However, an assistant county attorney is not
an authorized person if he accepts reimbursement from private sources for his
services before the grand jury. Maley v. District Ct., 221 Iowa 732, 266 N. W.
815 (1936) (paid by newspaper).
100. Robertson v. State, 52 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1951) ; State v. District
Ct., 124 Mont. 249, 220 P. 2d 1035 (1950) (specially appointed prosecutor).
It has been held that a judge may not interrogate witnesses before the grand
jury. Sanders v. State, 198 Miss. 587, 22 So. 2d 500 (1945).
101. See Dession and Cohen, supra note 7, at 697; Note, 4 Stan. L. Rev.
68, 70 (1951).
102. State v. Richey, 195 La. 319, 196 So. 545 (1940) ; cf. In re Mullen,
176 Misc. 442, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 846 (County Ct. 1941) ; see Note, 39 Calif. L.
Rev. 573, 576 (1951).
103. E.g., State v. Bates, 148 Ind. 610, 48 N. E. 2 (1897) ; Common-
wealth v. Kirk, 340 Pa. 346, 17 A. 2d 195 (1941) ; see Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d).
Contra: State v. Bowman, 90 Me. 363, 38 Atl. 331 (1897).
104. See State v. Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 70, 9 A. 2d 63, 68 (1939).
105. People v. Lem Deo, 132 Cal. 199, 64 Pac. 265 (1901).
106. State v. Chin Lung, 106 Conn. 701, 139 At]. 91 (1927).
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The general rule forbids the grand jury to retain its own counsel. 10 7
Justification lies in the fact that the district attorney is available for
the same service a private counsel could perform; nevertheless,
a situation may arise where the district attorney is either un-
cooperative or is himself the object of the investigation. Under
these circumstances it has been suggested that a new or an assistant
district attorney could be secured by request to the proper authori-
ties,"'1 but this would appear to be an inadequate remedy because
of the difficulty in showing non-cooperation and the natural inclina-
tion of higher state officials to uphold the district attorney.10 9 It
has also been established that the grand jury may not employ its
own private accountants but instead must use the permanent state
agencies concerned with accounting procedure. 10 Assistance in
crime detection must come from the individual jurors, the police,
or the district attorney, the courts having blocked attempts to hire
detectives or private investigators."' The rationale advanced is
either that the grand jury is without power to enter a contract of
employment with private investigatorsl2 or that such a contract is
void as against public policy on the grounds that "where your
treasure is, there will be your heart also."' More basic reasons
apparently are that employment of private agencies will destroy
the independence of the grand jury, lessen public confidence in it
and result in a needless and expensive duplication of the work of
the usual public agencies devoted to detection work." 4 Although
107. See Dession and Cohen, supra note 7, at 696; Trumpler, Decadence
of the Grand Jury System in England, 23 The Panel 7 (Jan. 1945).
108. See Appleton, Special Counsel for Grand Juries, 8 The Panel 1
(Sept.-Oct. 1930).
109. See State v. Platt, 193 La. 928, 192 So. 659 (1939) ; Rawson, A
Lawyer Looks at the Grand Jury, 4 W. Res. L. Rev. 19, 30-31 (1952) ; Note,
4 Stan. L. Rev. 68, 75 (1951).
110. Stone v. Bell, 35 Nev. 240, 129 Pac. 458 (1913); see Note, 17
N. C. L. Rev. 43, 50 (1938).
111. E.g.. People v. Kempley, 265 Pac. 310 (Cal. App. 2d Dist.), affd,
205 Cal. 441, 271 Pac. 478 (1928), 12 Minn. L. Rev. 761; William J. Burns
Int'l Detective Agency v. Holt, 138 Minn. 165, 164 N. W. 590 (1917).
112. An explanation generally used when the grand jury employs detec-
tives at government expense. See Allen v. Payne, 1 Cal. 2d 607, 36 P. 2d
614 (1934) ; Woody v. Peairs, 35 Cal. App. 553, 170 Pac. 660 (3d Dist. 1917).
113. See William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. Doyle, 46
Nev. 91, 97, 208 Pac. 427, 429 (1922), 7 Minn. L. Rev. 59. A rationale appro-
priate when the jurors individually employ the investigators. See William
J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency v. Holt, 138 Minn. 165, 164 N. W. 590
(1917).
114. See id. at 192, 208 Pac. at 429 (concurring opinion). It has been
suggested that the majority rule forbidding the grand jury to consider
hearsay evidence would prohibit consideration of a detective's report. See
William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency v. Holt, supra note 123, at 168, 164
N. W. at 59. While this is true, indictments are normally not quashed although
hearsay evidence is considered and the difficulty could, of course, be avoided
by questioning the detectives personally before the grand Jury.
1953]
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statutory authorization is apparently necessary in the employ-
ment of private investigators, such authority should be given in
view of the need in large scale inquiries for available and properly
equipped investigators coupled with the fact that the ordinary
channels of crime detection may be uncooperative, corrupt, un-
available or inefficient.115
Despite the universal denial of the right to hire private detec-
tives, the grand jury has been allowed by statute in some jurisdic-
tions to appoint at government expense a group of citizens to assist
an investigation." 6 A problem somewhat analogous to the authority
to utilize independent committees, but which apparently has never
been decided or discussed, is whether the results of federal grand
jury investigations may be used by state grand juries in aiding
inquiries of the same criminal problem from a local aspect. Although
the federal grand jury is legally limited to investigations of federal
law,1 17 frequently state problems are incidentally considered. The
use of a statement or report of a federal grand jury could not be
criticized on the ground that it permits unreliable evidence to go
to the jury,"18 is a breach of the secrecy of a grand jury hearing,
or amounts to the employment of private investigators. Thus, it
would seem that this help to local law enforcement should be per-
missible," 9 although there is always the danger of the state grand
jury shifting its burden of investigatory responsibility to the federal
grand jury and, conversely, the federal grand jury unduly invading
the province of state law enforcement agencies.
PERMISSIBLE ACTION AFTER AN INVESTIGATION
Upon the conclusion of a particular inquiry or the current in-
vestigative session, the grand jury will generally take action, either
in the form of an indictment, presentment or a report. Although the
power to render a formal accusation of guilt by means of an indict-
ment prepared and presented to the grand jury by the district
attorney is unquestioned, there is considerable uncertainty regard-
ing the use of presentments and reports. At common law a present-
115. See 35 Col. L. Rev. 613 (1935).
116. See McLarty v. Fulton County, 52 Ga. App. 445, 183 S. E. 646(1936) ; Chatham County v. Gaudry, 120 Ga. 121, 47 S. E. 634 (1904).
117. See note 23 supra, and text thereto.
118. Except in the situation where a state grand jury has more rigid
evidence admissibility requirements than the federal grand jury.
119. An analogy can be drawn from the the fact that a retiring grandjury may present a descriptive statement on the progress of an investigation
to a subsequent grand jury. See Howard v. State, 60 Ga. App. 229, 4 S. E.
2d 418 (1939). The personal presentation of the statement before the grand
jury by a committee of federal grand jurors would perhaps jeopardize a
future indictment-the prejudicial presence of unauthorized persons being the
grounds. Cf. State v. Ernster, 147 Minn. 81, 179 N. W. 640 (1920).
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ment was generally defined as an informal accusation originating
from the grand jury's own knowledge and directing the formula-
tion by the district attorney of a formal indictment or perhaps
criminal information.120 This legitimate form of action, less fre-
quently used today than at common law because of the usual close
cooperation of the district attorney during a general investigation,121
should be distinguished from a grand jury report,122 which has no
legal foundation and is not the basis for an indictment but which has
customarily been employed by grand juries since early common
law.' 2 Such reports, which are presented to the court to be placed
on record, are generally of two types: those which discuss, criticize
and make recommendations regarding matters of public interest
and those which censure and criticize particular individuals for
misconduct in their private lives or, more frequently, in public
office. 124 Since the reports frequently impugn personal character
and reputation with no opportunity to refute the charges by means
of a public trial as in the case of an indictment, there have been
frequent attempts to either expunge the reports from the record
or sue the jurors for libel. The majority of courts have condemned
such reports on the ground that the grand jury lacks the authority
to make them and have expunged them from the record on the
petition of an affected party.122 Particularily is this true in situations
where a private citizen is censured 26 or where a public official is
120. See Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,255, at 996(C.C.D. Cal. 1872) ; Nahum and Schatz, supra note 6, at 143. The present-
ment may be oral or written. See, e.g., O'Connell v. United States, 40 F. 2d
201, 203 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 281 U. S. 716, appeal dismissed per stip.,
296 U. S. 667 (1930). Some courts have erroneously used the terms indictment
and presentment interchangeably. See, e.g., In re Funston, 133 Misc. 620,
621-622, 233 N. Y. Supp. 81, 83 (1929).
121. See Charge to Grand Jury, supra note 132; Reviser's Note to 18
U. S. C. § 554 (1946) (obsolete). And see Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(f), which makes
no provision for presentments.
122. There has been a tendency in some jurisdictions to include the grandjury report within the term presentment. See Alexander, The Grand Jury-
A Potent Factor in Good Government, 16 The Panel 3 (Jan.-Feb. 1948).
123. See Edwards, The Grand Jury 157, 159.
124. See Dession and Cohen, supra note 7, at 706; 4 Stan. L. Rev. 68(1951). Additional but less frequently used types includes progress reports, see
Report of Grand Jury, 204 Wis. 409, 411, 235 N. W. 789, 790 (1931), and
reports by a retiring grand jury to its successor. See Howard v. State, 60 Ga.
App. 229, 4 S. E. 2d 418 (1939) ; note 119 supra.
125. E.g., Ex parte Robinson, 231 Ala. 503, 165 So. 582 (1936) ; In re
Report of Grand Jury, 152 Md. 616, 137 AtI. 370 (1927) ; In re Wilcox,
153 Misc. 761, 276 N. Y. Supp. 117 (Sup. Ct. 1934). See Bowman, Grand
Jury Report Censuring an Indii dual but Not Indicting Him, 22 Okla.
S. B. J. 635 (1951).
126. State v. District Ct., 216 Minn. 345, 12 N. W. 2d 776 (1944).
See ip re Healy, 161 Misc. 582, 293 N. Y. Supp. 584 (County Ct. 1937),
where the court expunged the report from the record because there was no
mention that the defanmed person was a public official.
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accused of a crime.127 However, there is more reluctance to expunge
reports resulting from an investigation initiated by the defamed
party 28 or which merely criticize the work of a public official short
of a criminal accusation 29 or discuss community problems without
censuring any particular person. 30 In actions by defamed citizens
against the grand jurors for libel-actions which may be supple-
mental to or in place of a petition to expunge the report-the courts
have taken various positions on the extent to which such reports
are covered by the usual privilege for judicial utterances.' 1 Since
the remedy of expunging a report from the record is of little curative
effect once the report's contents are made public, grand jurors
should not be immune from libel actions if it is clearly settled in that
particular jurisdiction that the type of report in question is not
permissible. However, if reports are allowed, or their availability
is uncertain in the state, jurors are entitled to be protected from
individual liability in the absence of a bad faith accusation.
132
Although many reasons for and against the use of reports have
been advanced by various courts and commentators, basically the
127.See In re Jones, 101 App. Div. 55, 58, 92 N. Y. Supp. 275, 276 (2d
Dep't), appeal dismissed, 181 N. Y. 389, 74 N. E. 226 (1905). For cases ex-
punging the record where a crime is charged see, e.g., Ex parte Faulkner,
251 S. W. 2d 822 (Ark. 1952) ; Bennett v. Kalamazoo Cir. judge, 183 Mich.
200, 150 N. W. 141 (1914). Contra: In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Fla.
154, 11 So. 2d 316 (1943).
128. See, e.g., Ex parte Cook, 199 Ark. 1187, 137 S. W. 2d 248 (1940);
Hayslip v. State, 193 Tenn. 643, 249 S. W. 2d 882, cert. denied, 344 U. S. 879
(1952) ; In re Knight, 176 Misc. 635, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 353 (Gen. Sess. 1941).
The treatment accorded the volunteer in this area is comparable to the dis-
like by some courts of the private prosecutor discussed above. See notes 41-42
supra, and text thereto.
129. For two recent decisions refusing to expunge this type of critical
report see Owens v. State, 59 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 1952) ; In re Presentment by
Camden County Grand Jury, 89 A. 2d 416 (N.J. 1952). See also In re Jones,
101 App. Div. 55, 92 N. Y. Supp. 275 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 181 N. Y.
389, 74 N. E. 226 (1905).
130. See, e.g., In re Osborne, 68 Misc. 597, 603, 125 N. Y. Supp. 313,
318 (Sup. Ct. 1910).
131. See, e.g., Rector v. Smith, 11 Iowa 302 (1860) (qualified privilege)
Bennett v. Stockwell, 197 Mich. 50, 163 N. W. 482 (1917), 2 Minn. L. Rev.
154 (1918) (no privilege) ; O'Regan v. Schermerhorn, 25 N. J. Misc. 1, 50
A. 2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1946), 31 Minn. Lev. Rev. 500 (1947) (absolute privilege) ;
Note, 64 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 391 (1916). Newspapers which publish critical
grand jury reports have generally been accorded a qualified privilege. See
Parsons v. Age-Herald Pub. Co., 181 Ala. 439, 61 So. 345 (1913) ; Ferguson v.
Houston Press, 1 S. W. 2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927). But cf. Poston v.
Washington, Alex. & Mt. Vern. R. R., 36 D. C. App. 359 (1911). Grandjurors have been held in contempt of court for defaming the presiding judge
in a report. Coons v. State, 191 Ind. 580, 134 N. E. 194 (1922).
132. Caution should be exercised when using decisions involving libel
actions for authority on the power of the grand jury to make reports. See
O'Regan v. Schermerhorn, 25 N. J. Misc. 1, 50 A. 2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1946), 31
Minn. L. Rev. 500 (1947) (court found for jurors on libel issue without
deciding permissibility of reports).
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issue of whether or not to permit them is one of balancing the
interest of protecting the innocent from accusations which they have
no means of rebutting with the desirability of grand jury exposure
of community irregularities. A realistic approach to the problems
would dictate the ascertainment of whether grand jury reports, as a
matter of historical fact, have been both accurate and beneficial, for
only a pragmatic answer is sufficient to counter an argument based
on the serious harm befalling a victim of false accusations. But
while it is obviously impossible to precisely guage the accuracy of
the average grand jury report, at least in some jurisdictions such
reports have accomplished much in precipitating needed reforms in
the community. 33 And thus a consideration of the other factors in-
volved would appear proper.
Reports which comment on general community conditions with-
out criticizing any particular individual should be clearly per-
missible for in this type of report there is no substantial danger
to personal interests. If the grand jury is allowed to issue reports
containing accusations against private individuals for misconduct
short of actual crime, undoubtedly some innocent people will be
defamed without opportunity to be heard in reply. But the benefits
to be gained from such exposures plus the power of the court to which
the grand jury is appendant to strike the report if it is prompted by
bias or based on unreliable information 34 justify them. The argu-
ment for permitting reports is even stronger if the accused is in a
position of public trust demanding a high degree of honesty and
competency.'-3 It is contended that the grand jury by citing per-
sons for conduct not considered criminal by the legislature is setting
the moral standards of the community ;136 but this argument, besides
being irrelevant, overlooks the fact that conduct which is in accord
with the accepted mode of behavior will be ignored by the commu-
nity. On the other hand, an attempt has been made to justfy reports
containing actual accustations of crimes on the ground that even if
the accusations are erroneous, they are no more injurious than an
133. See e.g., In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 89
A. 2d 416, 429-438 (N.J. 1952) ; Wilkes, 1934 Grand Jury Presentments Ex-
pose Flagrant Conditions in New York County, 13 The Panel 1 (Jan.-Feb.
1935).
134. See In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 89 A. 2d 416,
444 (N.J. 1952). The action of the judge is subject to review since the grandjurors wuold be aggrieved parties and thus eligible to prosecute on appead.
Ibid.
135. See In re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Fla. 154, 159, 11 So. 2d 316,
319 (1943) ; In re Healy, 161 Misc. 582, 594, 293 N. Y. Supp. 584, 597-598
(County Ct. 1937).
136. See It re Jones, 101 App. Div. 55, 59-60, 92 N. Y. Supp. 275, 278
(2d Dep't) (dissenting opinion), appeal dismissed, 181 N. Y. 389, 74 N. E.
226 (1905).
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unfounded indictment or presentment. 137 This reasoning is hardly
satisfactory, rationalizing as it does two undesirable results to reach
the desired one. Accusations of crime, in many instances, carry
no more disrepute than mere allegations of misconduct, but a formi-
dable argument, not available in the case of laxity or misconduct
charges, can be advanced that if there is not sufficient evidence to
warrant an indictment or presentment regarding a certain crime,
no action should be taken by the grand jury. 38 This rationale to-
gether with the interest in protecting the innocent from irrebutable
accusations should be enough to forbid reports charging both private
citizens and public officials with crimes. N'Ioreover, making the line
between permissible and non-permissible reports depend on whether
or not a crime is charged in them opens the door to possible abuse
by the jury which could couch an accusation of crime in non-criminal
terms. This practice could, however, be prevented by a realistic
judicial examination of the report before acceptance for filing.
CONCLUSION
Since the grand jury is an institution born and nurtured in
common law, it lacks in many ways the tools necessary for investi-
gations in a modem society. Nevertheless, the grand jury is better
endowed than the other investigative organs of government which
are in some manner more limited in inquisitorial power than the
grand jury. For instance, the public prosecutor may inquire into
criminal matters but is in most jurisdictions without the aid of
subpoena and contempt powers.13 9 A magistrate on the other hand
has subpoena power but his investigations are limited generally by
a specific charge and necessity of probable cause that a definite crime
was committed by a designated person. 40 Legislative committee
investigations are at least formally limited by the requirement that
they be made as a basis for future legislative action,' 4' whereas
special administrative investigation boards and commissions are
generally confined to inquiries regarding specific irregularities. 4 2
137. See In re Presentment by Camden County Grand Jury, 89 A. 2d 416,
444 (N.J. 1952) ; see State v. Reichert, 226 Ind. 358, 80 N. E. 289 (1948).
138. See Note, 17 B. U. L. Rev. 438, 439 (1937).
139. See Dession and Cohen, supra note 7, at 689.
140. E.g., It re Both, 200 App. Div. 423, 192 N. Y. S. 822 (2d Dep't
1922) ; see In re Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 38 F. 2d 833, 836-837 (N.D. Cal.
1930) (U. S. Commissioner) ; see Dession and Cohen, supra note 7, at 689-
691. Cf. note 52 supra, and text thereto (Same limitation).
141. See United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, 58 (1953). (concurring
opinion) ; see Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power
of Investigation, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 219 (1926) ; 37 Minn. L. Rev. 297
(1953).
142. For illustrations of administrative officials being endowed with
inquisitorial power see It re Edge Ho Holding Corp., 256 N. Y. 374, 176
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Further, all these investigatory bodies are more susceptible than the
grand jury to obstructionist tactics such as perjured or evasive
testimony and attacks on jurisdiction and scope of inquiry.14 Some
states, realizing that the common law type of grand jury can not
continue to meet the competition of other investigatory agencies,
have made rapid progress in providing the grand jury with the
powers it needs in order to carry on modem day investigations. The
grand jury has been permitted to use stenographers, utilize fully
the office of the district attorney, initiate investigations on its own
motion, and consider hearsay evidence. But there is room for im-
provement such as permitting the grand jury to employ its own
counsel, accountants and detectives. Even if it should be con-
sidered that an extension of present grand jury power is unde-
sirable, a complete and thorough codification of these powers is
needed and would be welcomed in most jurisdictions.
N. E. 537 (1931) ; Konowitz, supra note 1, at 233-234. For a representative
compilation of state statutes conferring inquisitorial powers on government
officials, boards and commissions see Handler, The Constitutionality of In-
vestigations by the Federal Trade Commission: II, 28 Col. L. Rev. 905, 928
n. 106 (1928).
143. See Dession and Cohen, supra note 7, at 699-702.
